Four experiments investigated the hypothesis that different attributes of a visual scene are processed by independent channels working asynchronously. Experiment 1 considered the attributes of colour, form, and movement of simple geometrical configurations. In each of three conditions, two of these attributes switched simultaneously between two fixed values (Green/Red, Circle/ Square, Fixed/Moving). Participants indicated which of the two attributes changes was perceptually closer in time to a sound signal. Response probabilities varied as a function of the time of occurrence of the sound, showing that the processing of the movement channel is delayed with respect to the other two. A smaller but significant difference was also detected between the processing times for colour and form. Comparing Experiments 1 and 2 showed that movement velocity does not affect the delay with which movement onset is perceived with respect to colour. Experiment 3 contrasted colour and movement in the perception of a biological movement. The stimuli were video clips of a coloured ball being lifted by a hand. The colour of the ball changed a variable amount of time before or after the ball started moving. Participants indicated which of the two changes had occurred first. We found that, unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, movement perception no longer lagged colour perception. Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis that the disappearance of the asynchrony is due to perceptual anticipation. We discuss the implications of the results vis-a-vis current theories on perceptual binding and on the coding of dynamic events.
Introduction
Converging evidence suggests that attributes of the visual world such as colour, shape, depth, and movement, are analysed by autonomous functional modules in the brain. For instance, Julesz's random-dot stereograms demonstrate that depth information is extracted reliably even though there is no identifiable figural detail in the scene that can be matched binocularly (Julesz, 1960) . The existence of functionally autonomous modules dedicated to the analysis of specific attributes is also suggested by clinical cases in which the perception of one attribute is either selectively impaired, or selectively spared (review in Zeki, 1990 Zeki, , 1991 . Moreover, the modular hypothesis is consistent with anatomical and physiological evidence suggesting that different attributes are extracted in specialized and geographically distinct visual areas outside the primary visual cortex (Bullier, 2001; Felleman & van Essen, 1991; Gegenfurtner, Kiper, & Fenstemaker, 1996; Leventhal, Thompson, Liu, Zhou, & Ault, 1995; Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Zeki, 1978 Zeki, , 1993 .
Recently, the modular hypothesis has been generalised by the further assumption that the processing modules are also perceptual modules, making their own autonomous contribution to the genesis of conscious, perceptual experience (Zeki & Bartels, 1998a , 1998b . If so, it is possible that these modules reach their perceptual end-point at different times. This, in fact, seems to be the case. Recent behavioural experiments suggested that simultaneous changes in the colour, form, position, and movement attributes of a stimulus are not perceived at the same time (Arnold, Clifford, & Wenderoth, 2001; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a , 1997b Viviani & Aymoz, 2001) . In all cases, the processing of movement information was found to be more time-consuming than that of either colour or form information, despite the widely held belief that the system underlying movement perception can follow more rapid events than the system underlying colour and form perception (Livingstone & Hubel, 1987) . Instead, there is disagreement about the speed of colour processing relative to the processing of geometrical attributes such as orientation, form, and position. Moutoussis and Zeki (1997b) reported that colour outpaced orientation by as much as 63 ms. Viviani and Aymoz (2001) , with a different experimental technique found no significant difference between colour and form. Pisella, Arzi, and Rossetti (1998) studying the affects of changing colour and position of the target at the onset of a manual pointing, concluded that colour processing is slower than position processing by about 80 ms. Finally, it should be noted that the temporal frequency cut-off for equiluminant chromatic change is much lower than for luminance change (Ives, 1923) , suggesting that the colour system is slower than the luminance system.
In spite of its relative popularity, the modular doctrine of vision is not the only theoretical framework available for integrating neurophysiological and behavioural evidence. Based on an extensive reviews of the literature, Lennie (1998) has recently challenged the modular doctrine suggesting that the various attributes of an image are not parcelled out to separate areas, but that their analysis remains intimately couples at all stages of analysis (Burr, 1999) . Clearly, the presence of asynchronies in the perception of the various visual attributes is far more in keeping with the modular doctrine than with the opposite view advocated by Lennie that through all stages of analysis all dimensions of the image remain intimately coupled. Therefore it seems desirable to verify that included perceptual asynchrony do exist.
Four experiments were conducted to investigate further the relative timing with which changes in colour, form and movement are processed.
Experiment 1
If confirmed, differences among the duty cycles of different perceptual channels would pose the challenging problem of why the corresponding asynchronies are not perceptually conspicuous under most real life conditions. Nishida and Johnston (2002) , noting that the problem arises only insofar as simultaneity illusions are interpreted in terms of neural-processing delays, argued, that such an interpretation is not logically compelling on the sole basis of experiments involving sequences of rapidly alternating stimuli (Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a , 1997b . In particular, the large delay in motion perception measured with this technique may reflect the coupling of heterogeneous temporal landmarks (colour transitions, with movement turning points, Johnston & Nishida, 2001; Nishida & Johnston, 2000a , 2000b , rather than true duty-cycle differences. This alternative explanation was supported by two experiments (Nishida & Johnston, 2002) showing that the apparent perceptual motion delay depends on the rate of alternation, and disappears in the case of a single transition between two colours and two motion directions. This latter observation contradicts directly the results of our previous experiment (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001 ). Although we had eluded Nishida and Johnston's criticism by testing only single transitions, motion perception was again found to be delayed with respect to colour and form perception, as originally claimed by Zeki (1997a, 1997b) . Thus, the first goal of Experiment 1 was to confirm that, at least as far as the movement channel is concerned, differences in processing time are real, not an artefact of the measuring technique. Second, we wanted to try and adjudge the unsettled issue of whether form and colour information is processed at the same speed. To pursue these two goals, we introduced a new technique for measuring the relative timing with which we perceive changes in the colour, form and movement attributes of a visual display.
Method
Participants. Twenty University of Geneva students (17 female and 3 male; age range: 18-29 years) volunteered for the study. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and had no known deficiency in colour perception. Participants were naive about the purpose of the experiment. They gave their informed consent and were paid 20-40 Swiss Francs, according to their performance. The Ethical Committee of the University of Geneva approved the experimental protocol.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was conducted in a quiet room kept in dim light. Participants seated at a distance of about 50 cm in front of a computer monitor (HP mod. D8901; resolution 800 · 600 pixels; vertical refresh rate: 84 Hz; CIE chromatic coordinates: Red: (x ¼ 0:6116, y ¼ 0:3418), Green: (x ¼ 0:2922, y ¼ 0:5974) and Blue: (x ¼ 0:1456, y ¼ 0:0688)). A graphic software (Authorware) controlled the generation of the stimuli and the recording of the responses. The stimuli were two geometrical figures: a solid square (side: 8.87 deg) and a solid circle (radius ¼ 4.96 deg) with the same surface (at the viewing distance, 1 cm subtends approximately 1 degree of visual angle). The figures were defined only by their colour (green or red; no outlines). The stimuli were made isoluminant with the help of a DPT92 Monitor Calibrator (X-Rite Inc., Grandville, MI, US). The CIE X , Y , Z coordinates for green and red were: (X ¼ 9:86, Y ¼ 18:94, Z ¼ 4:32) and (X ¼ 32:69, Y ¼ 18:17, Z ¼ 3:09), respectively. Stimuli were presented against a grey background (X ¼ 28:15, Y ¼ 30:33, Z ¼ 44:88). A sound stimulus (1 ms square impulse with an intensity of 43 dB) was also delivered in conjunction with the presentation of the visual stimuli (see later).
In addition to the colour ([C]: Green/Red) and form ([F] : Circle/Square) attributes, the stimuli were also defined their state of motion ([M] : Fixed/Moving). In the ''Fixed'' modality, the figures remained at the centre of the screen. In the ''Moving'' modality, they moved from the centre toward the upper right corner of the screen with a constant velocity of 9.5 deg/s.
Experimental procedure and task. There were three conditions, one for each pairing of the stimuli attributes: Form/Colour (FC), Colour/Movement (CM) and Form/ Movement (FM). In each condition, a trial comprised the following steps: a fixation point (a solid black circle, 1 deg in diameter) appeared at the centre of the screen for 1 s. After its disappearance, one of the two geometrical figures in one of the two colours (the initial stimulus, for example, Red Square) was displayed at the centre of the screen. After 1 s, the two attributes selected for comparison switched simultaneously to their other value (the final stimulus). For instance, in condition FC a Green Square became a Red Circle, and in condition CM a Red Square turned into a Green Square, and, at the same time, started moving. The final stimulus (either still or moving) was displayed for 1 s, making the entire sequence last 2 s (Fig. 1) . A sound stimulus occurred before, at the same time, or after the attribute changes with an asynchrony (SOA) D varying between 0 and 300 ms in 6 steps of 50 ms. The timing of the sound relative to the attribute changes was controlled by the Authorware program with a 1 ms accuracy. By convention, the sign of the asynchrony was set as positive (negative) when the sound occurred before (after) the change. Altogether, there were 13 SOA values. After the final stimulus had disappeared, the screen was filled with the uniform background. Participants were told that the sound stimulus would occur near the transitions, but ignored that actually both stimulus attributes switched simultaneously. Their task was to indicate (forcedchoice) which attribute change had occurred closer in time (either before or after) to the sound stimulus. The response was entered soon after the disappearance of the final stimulus by using three keys in the upper row of the keyboard (F5 for answer C, Esc for answer F, and F10 for answer M). A new trial started immediately after entering the response.
In condition FC there were four possible transitions between the initial and final stimulus. In conditions CM and FM there were only two relevant transitions, because we wanted the movement to start always at the centre of the screen. Thus, the movement attribute was always Fixed for the initial stimulus and Moving for the final stimulus. However, we added two additional transitions by combining also the irrelevant attribute (Form for CM, and Colour for FM) in the definition of the initial stimulus. Thus, there were 4 [transitions] · 13 [SOA] ¼ 52 different sequences for each condition (Table  1) . Each sequence was presented 10 times for a total of 560 trials (sequences with D ¼ 0 were presented twice). The sample size for computing individual responses was 40 for D 6 ¼ 0 and 80 for D ¼ 0. Conditions were blocked and administered in separate sessions. Within each condition, the order of presentation of the sequences was randomised for each participant. The order in which conditions were tested was counterbalanced across participants. Sessions lasted approximately one hour. At the participant's request, the experiment could be interrupted for a short rest.
Before each session the experimenter provided the general instructions, and demonstrated the experimental conditions of the session by 10 practice trials.
Results
The results are presented in the form of psychometric functions which, for any two attributes A 1 and A 2 , describe the relationship between the SOA and the relative frequency P ðA 1 Þ with which the sound stimulus was perceived closer in time to the switching of attribute A 1 than to the switching of attribute A 2 (recall that the sign of the SOA indicates whether the sound occurred before ½D > 0, after ½D < 0, or simultaneously ½D ¼ 0 with the transition). The data points in the three panels in Fig. 2 describe the psychometric functions for the indicated contrasts (smoothed averages over all participants). The continuous curves through the data points are the predictions of a psychophysical model to be introduced later. Perceptual biases were estimated by the response frequency at D ¼ 0 (P D¼0 , Table 2 ). For all contrasts P D¼0 was significantly larger than 0. In condition FC, response probabilities were almost symmetrical with respect to D ¼ 0, where P (Form) was maximum. The sound stimulus was likely to be processed faster than both colour and form changes (average processing time: 36 ms, P€ oppel, 1988) . Therefore, the fact that P (Form) was significantly higher than chance level for small absolute values of the SOA implies that the interval between the perception of the sound and that of a form change was shorter than the interval between the perception of the sound and that of a colour change. In other words, form change were perceived before colour changes. P (Form) was lower than chance level when the sound stimulus was delivered either long before, or long after the attribute switching. This seemingly paradoxical inversion is well captured by the psychophysical model (see interpolating lines in Fig.  2 ). We shall return to this specific prediction when the model is introduced.
The psychophysical functions for the two comparisons involving movement (CM and FM) were asymmetric and fairly similar. Both P (Colour) and P (Form) remained well above chance level when the sound was occurred either before, or up to 100 ms after the switching. This suggests that both colour and form changes were perceived well before movement onset. The probability of perceiving the sound closer to movement onset than to the change in colour or form is maximum for D $ 200 ms. Thus, the asynchrony between the movement channel and the other two channels should be roughly 200 ms.
Differences among conditions were tested statistically by considering the average (non-smoothed) frequencies for all SOA values (separate one-way ANOVAs after applying the Freeman and Tukey variance-stabilising arcsin transformation, Table 3 ). Significant differences emerged for most negative, and for two positive values of the SOA.
The foregoing qualitative analysis of the psychophysical functions relative to the three comparisons between attributes confirmed that, although attributes switched simultaneously, their changes reached consciousness at different times. We used a psychophysical model to estimate quantitatively the asynchrony among the corresponding channels. The model (Fig. 3) assumes that the visual attributes and the sound stimulus are processed independently. The delays with which changes in attributes A 1 and A 2 , and the sound stimulus S are perceived are random variables X 1 , X 2 and S with Gaussian probability density function (pdf) d 1 , d 2 , and d s , respectively. The relative position of the three pdf's on the time axis depends jointly on the SOA and on the average processing times. The differences V ¼ X 1 À S and W ¼ X 2 À S determine the response through a deterministic rule. Suppose that at least one of the two variables V and W is positive and smaller than a threshold
The rule incorporates the intuition that no consistent response strategy exists if either (1) V > T and W > T , i.e. the moments when attribute changes are perceived are too far away from the moment when the sound is perceived for a reliable discrimination of time differences, or (2) V < 0 and W < 0, i.e. attribute changes are both perceived before the sound. In the first case, we supposed a decay of the memory traces of the time of perception for the attribute changes. In the second case, the reason for not having a consistent response strategy is supposed to be the lack of the reference landmark when attribute changes are perceived. In either case, the model assumes that participants respond at random with P ðA 1 Þ ¼ P ðA 2 Þ ¼ 0:5. , 250, 200, 150, 100, 50, 0 (ms) 3B ) over the corresponding regions of the ðV ; W Þ plane (Fig. 3C) . Specifically, let
The model has seven parameters, the averages ðl 1 ; l 2 ; l s Þ and standard deviations ðr 1 ; r 2 ; r s Þ of the pdf's, and the threshold T . However, because we were interested only in time differences, scales were fixed by setting arbitrarily the parameters for the sound stimulus: l s ¼ 100 ms, r s ¼ 1 ms. Moreover, we imposed the constraint that the threshold T and the averages ðl C ; l F ; l M Þ for attributes C, F , and M assume the same values for all three pair-wise contrasts. Instead, the standard deviations were allowed to depend on the attributes being contrasted.
The model was fitted simultaneously to the 3 [conditions] · 13 [SOA] ¼ 39 average probabilities. Table 4 reports the least-square estimates of the model parameters calculated by a standard Simplex minimization routine. The model predictions corresponding to these estimates (continuous lines in Fig. 2 ) interpolate quite precisely the average response probabilities (even more accurate fittings were obtained by allowing the threshold and the attribute means to vary slightly across conditions). In summary, relative to the arbitrary sound reference (l s ¼ 100 ms), the processing of form, colour, and movement was estimated to take an additional time of 61, 89, and 252 ms, respectively. Therefore, the delay between colour and form was 28 ms, the delay between movement and colour was 163 ms, and the delay between movement and form was 191 ms. Note (Table 4) that in the Form/Colour contrast the colour variance was twice as large as the form variance. Thus, although the distribution for colour was delayed with respect to the distribution for form, there were instances where colour change was in fact perceived before form change. Therefore, the model (correctly) predicts the counterintuitive observation that the probability of answering ''Colour'' exceeds the probability of answering ''Form'' for large negative values of D (Fig. 2 ).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the velocity of the stimuli (9.5 deg/s) in the Colour/Movement and Form/Movement conditions was the same as that used in Viviani and Aymoz (2001) , so as to be able to compare the results across different tasks. It is known (Hohnsbein & Mateeff, 1992 ) that reaction times to both motion onset and offset depend on velocity. By analogy, it is possible that also the perceptual asynchronies estimated in Experiment 1 depend on stimulus velocity. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a control experiment using a different stimulus velocity. The new velocity has been selected by taking into account the experimental conditions of Experiment 3 (see later) in which the stimuli are moved by a natural grasping movement whose approach phase, as displayed on the screen, was at 20 deg/s. By doing so, we will be able to compare also the results from this experiment with those involving the display of a biological movement.
Method
Participants. We tested again five of the twenty individuals who had participated to Experiment 1 (5 female; age range: 21-29 years). Participants were na€ ıve about the purpose of the experiment. They gave their informed consent and were paid 10 to 20 Swiss Francs, according to their performance. The Ethical Committee of the University of Geneva approved the experimental protocol.
Apparatus, stimuli, experimental procedure and task. The apparatus and the general experimental conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. The only difference was the velocity of the movement (20 deg/s instead of 9.5 Note--P D¼0 : response probability when sound and attribute changes occur simultaneously. 
Results
The results are presented in Fig. 4 with the same format as Fig. 2 . As in Experiment 1, P (Colour) remained above chance level when the sound was occurred either before, or up to 50 ms after the switching between attributes, suggesting that colour changes were perceived well before movement onset. Over and above the minor numerical differences between the two set of data, and the higher values of the variances, which reflect also the smaller sample size (5 vs 20 participants), it is clear that doubling the velocity of the stimuli did not alter significantly the asynchrony between colour and movement. This is also demonstrated by the interpolation of the data points by the model. For this fitting we fixed all the parameters of the model to the same values obtained in Experiment 1, with the exception of the variances for colour and movement. The new optimal values of the variances were very close to those already computed before, and the interpolation was equally satisfactory.
Individual perceptual biases were again estimated by the response frequency at D ¼ 0 (Table 2) . Because the participants to this experiment also served for the previous one, statistical analysis was conducted on the individual values of P D¼0 . The difference between , and the sound click are perceived after completing a processing requiring a random amount of time (X 1 , X 2 and S). In this example the sound precedes the attribute changes ðD > 0Þ. The probability density functions (pdf) of the processing times (d 1 , d 2 , and d S ) are all Gaussian. The mean processing time for the sound ðl S Þ is supposed to be shorter than that for both visual attributes (l 1 and l 2 ). Participants are asked to compare the differences V ¼ X 1 À S and W ¼ X 2 À S. The pdf's of V and W are the convolution of d s ðÀtÞ and d 1 ðtÞ and the convolution of d s ðÀtÞ and d 2 ðtÞ, respectively. (B) The joint pdf dðV ; W Þ of V and W. (C) The response rule maps into a partition of the ðV ; W Þ plane. The probability of answer A 1 ðA 2 Þ is the integral of dðV ; W Þ over the regions marked ½X 1 (½X 2 ) plus half the integral over the regions marked ½X 1 =X 2 . Table 4 Experiments 1 and 2: best fitting parameters of the model 
Experiment 3
The perceptual modularity hypothesis is intimately related to the so-called binding problem. If indeed the various attributes of a visual event were processed independently, it would seem necessary to posit a mechanism for tagging the outputs of the different channels, so that, ultimately, they are all associated to one and the same event. Treisman and co-workers (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) have suggested that visual attention plays this binding role. Specifically, when a visual event draws attention, a selective enhancement of the event's features would be followed by an integration of the features into a unified representation. The nature of such an hypothetical integration mechanism, however, remains elusive. In particular, the evidence summarized above that feature processing can be asynchronous is damaging for the only detailed account of this mechanism put forward so far, namely, that integration is achieved by the temporal synchronization of neural activities that, in different networks, signal the processing of different attributes of the same event (Maslburg van der & Schneider, 1986; Singer & Gray, 1993) .
Zeki and his co-workers (Aleksander & Dunmall, 2000; Zeki & Bartels, 1998a , 1998b have attempted to bypass the difficulty by taking issue with the very idea that visual consciousness arises from feature binding (Crick & Koch, 1990; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992) . Instead, according to Zeki's version of the modular hypothesis, each specialised feature-processing system yields its computational output at a specific node of the visual network. The activity at each node is perceptually explicit, giving rise to a separate state of micro-consciousness. Thus, rather than preceding or facilitating visual consciousness, binding actually brings together the activity of multiple micro-consciousnesses, and it is no longer necessary to posit a final stage of processing where conscious visual perception is represented. Despite this claim, however, it is not obvious that Zeki's view of perceptual modularity does actually reconcile the possibility that visual attributes are processed asynchronously with the fact we have a coherent perception of visual events.
The nature of the binding mechanism might become more understandable if we were able to demonstrate that differences in processing rates are contingent upon some specific characteristics of the visual event. There are reasons to suspect that one such characteristics is the fact that the event involves a human gesture. Indeed, biological movements, qua visual stimuli, have peculiar properties. Following Johansson (Johansson, 1973 (Johansson, , 1976 (Johansson, , 1977 several authors have shown that bodily movements have a remarkable perceptual saliency. Even sketchy descriptions of the joint positions afford a vivid image of the actual movement identity of the agent (Cutting, Proffitt, & Kozlowski, 1978; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977) , to extract the symbolic meaning of a gesture (Poizner, Bellugi, & Lutes-Driscoll, 1981) , and even to discriminate his own walking pattern from that of others (Beardworth & Buckner, 1981) . Even facial expressions can be perceived from the movements of a few point-light (Bassili, 1978) . Because a preference for biological movements emerges as early as 3-5 months of age (Bertenthal, Proffitt, & Cutting, 1984; Fox & McDaniel, 1982) , this sharp perceptual tuning is likely to reflect inborn properties of the underlying neural machinery (Oram & Perrett, 1994) .
At the functional level, several studies have suggested that the saliency of biological movements, as well as a number of perceptual effects, originate from the interplay between sensory data and the implicit competence shared by all humans about the peculiar characteristics of their movements (for a review, see Viviani, 2002) . At the neurophysiological level, the hypothesis that motor competence enters into the perception of dynamic events involving voluntary action is supported by the recent discovery of neurons in the monkey premotor cortex--the so-called ''mirror neurons'' that respond both when the animal performs a specific manual action, and it watches the same action performed by an external agent (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2000) .
Based on this evidence for a special perceptual status of human gestures, Experiment 3 was designed to test the hypothesis that the considerable lag with which the movement aspect is perceived relative to form and colour disappears when the motion results overtly from the intervention of a human agent.
Method
Participants. Twenty University of Geneva students (13 female and 7 male; age range: 21-31 years) volunteered for the study. None of them had served for the first experiment. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal acuity and had no known deficiency in colour perception. Participants were naive about the purpose of the experiment. They gave their informed consent, and were paid 20-40 Swiss Francs according to their performance. The Ethical Committee of the University of Geneva approved the experimental protocol.
Apparatus and Stimulus. The apparatus and the general experimental conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. We recorded several video clips of a hand gesture with a digital camera (Sony DCR-TRV900E). At the beginning of the clip (Fig. 5) , the hand was laying palm-down on a horizontal surface, at about 10 cm to the right of a ball placed at the centre of the scene. Then, the hand moved forward, seized the ball with the natural five-finger grip, and lifted it outside the scene. The entire sequence lasted 3 s. The size of the ball on the screen was the same as that of the circular stimulus in Experiment 1 (radius ¼ 4.96 cm). All spatial references were suppressed by covering the surface with dark uniform fabric (CIE coordinates: X ¼ 2:00, Y ¼ 1:98, Z ¼ 3:19). After visual inspection, we selected two clips with the criterion that (1) the ball remained clearly visible throughout the sequence; (2) the approach phase of the hand movement was similar, but not identical, in the two clips; (3) the trajectory of the lifting phase followed as closely as possible the diagonal line directed to the upper right corner of the screen, as the moving stimuli in Experiment 1. The average velocity of the hand during the lifting was approximately 20 deg/s. By editing the video clip with a standard software (Adobe Premiere), we could change the hue of the ball while leaving the rest of the scene unchanged (note that changing the hue did not alter the original shading of the ball's surface). From each selected clip, we generated 36 stimulus sequences. In half of them, the ball was red (CIE coordinates X ¼ 25:42, Y ¼ 14:76, Z ¼ 4:08) at the beginning of the clip, and became green (CIE coordinates X ¼ 7:87, Y ¼ 14:95, Z ¼ 3:24) in the course of the sequence (because the shading of the ball's surface was not uniform, the indicated CIE coordinates are averages of a number of measures performed with the monitor calibrator). In the other half, the colour switched in the opposite direction. In both cases, the ball remained globally isoluminant (14.76 vs 14.95). Each sequence within the two subgroups of 18 was characterized by the rank order K of the frame in which the colour switched with respect to frame in which the ball began to move. In 9 sequences, the colour switched before ðK ¼ þ8; þ7; . . . þ1Þ or at ðK ¼ 0Þ movement onset. In the remaining 9 the switch occurred after ðK ¼ À1; À2; . . . À 8Þ or at ðK ¼ 0Þ movement onset. At the recording speed of 25 frames/s, the asynchrony D between the switching of the Colour (C: Green/Red) and Movement (M: Fixed/ Moving) attributes ranged between )320 and +320 ms in steps of 40 ms. By convention, the sign of the SOA was set as negative when the ball left the ground before the change of colour and positive in the complementary case. By crossing the two original clips with all combinations of attributes and SOA, we obtained 72 different stimuli (Table 5) .
Experimental conditions, procedure and task. Aside from the nature of the stimuli, and the fact that we tested only the Colour/Movement contrast, the procedure was exactly as in the experiment reported previously (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001) . Briefly, trials began with a fixation point (a solid black circle 1 deg in diameter) lasting 1 s at the centre of a uniform gray background (CIE coordinates X ¼ 28:15, Y ¼ 30:33, Z ¼ 44:88). Immediately afterward, one video clip was displayed at the centre of the screen. At the end, the screen was filled with the background and remained so until the participant initiated a new trial by entering the response. The task was to indicate (forced-choice) which attribute had changed first, i.e. whether the colour of the ball had changed before (answer C), or after (answer M) the ball had started moving. Responses were entered by using two keys in the upper row of the keyboard (Esc for M and F12 for C). Each of the 72 different sequences was presented 10 times for a total of 720 trials. The selection of the sequence was randomised for each participant with the constraint that the same sequence was never presented twice in successive trials. Sequences with D ¼ 0 occurred twice. Thus, the sample size for computing individual response frequencies was 40 for D 6 ¼ 0, and 80 for D ¼ 0. An experimental session lasted approximately one hour, including a brief rest period that participants could allow themselves. Each session was preceded by a period of adaptation to the dim ambient light, a verbal description of the task, and a familiarisation phase of 10 trials.
Results
The results are presented in the form of a psychometric function describing the relationship between the SOA ðDÞ, and the relative frequency P (Colour) with which colour switching was perceived before movement onset. The middle panel in Fig. 6 shows the psychometric function obtained by averaging the relative frequencies over all participants.
The z-transform of the raw (un-smoothed) response frequencies could not be fit adequately by a linear regression, indicating that the psychometric function deviated significantly from a cumulative Gaussian distribution (lower panel of Fig. 6) . At the population level, there was no obvious perceptual bias in favour of either attribute (median ¼ À0:024) and a fairly low differential threshold (JND ¼ 0:123).
For all participants, the response probabilities P (Colour) increased monotonously toward as a function of the SOA, levelling at a value close to 1. Individual differences were estimated by three parameters of the psychometric function, namely the response frequency at D ¼ 0 ðP D¼0 Þ, the SOA for which responses are at chance level ðD p¼0:50 Þ, and the Just-Noticeable-Difference JND ¼ ðD p¼0:75 À D p¼0:25 Þ=2. The values D p¼0:50 , D p¼0:75 , and D p¼0:25 were computed by a spline interpolation of the un-smoothed response frequencies. There was some variability in P D¼0 , which was based on just one measure (Table 6 ). By contrast, individual estimates of D p¼0:50 and of the JND were quite homogeneous, and their population averages were very close to the corresponding values computed from the average psychometric function. Moreover, D p¼0:50 did not differ significantly from 0 (two-tailed t-test, t ¼ 0:479).
We estimated the distribution of the duration of the perceptual processing for movement with the same method devised in our previous study (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001) . Briefly, the analysis is based on the assumption that colour and movement changes are processed independently. The processing times are described by random variables, t C and t M , with probability density functions (pdf) d C and d M (upper panel of Fig.  7 ). The response is supposed to be dictated by the dif- Fig. 6 ) shows that also d M is very nearly Gaussian. The estimated mean l M is almost 0. Thus, the processing times for colour and movement are indeed almost identical as suggested also by the data of Table 6 . 320, 280, 240, 200, 160, 120, 80, 40, 0 (ms) 5 
Experiment 4
The disappearance of the colour-movement latency in Experiment 3 could be due to the fact that the approach phase of the hand movement provides anticipatory cues about the moment when the ball is grasped and lifted. In other words, the delay with which movement onset is perceived would be offset by estimating the time-tocontact before the contact actually takes place. Thus, before claiming any role for the natural character of the dynamic event in suppressing the perceptual asynchrony, it was necessary to demonstrate that anticipatory clues per se do not affect movement perception. To this end, we designed a control experiment in which the movement of the ball is prompted by the impact of a non-biological stimulus whose motion provides the same timing cues as the approaching hand.
Method
Participants. Ten University of Geneva students (3 male and 7 female; age range: 23-30 years) who had already participated to Experiment 3 served also for this experiment. They were paid 20-40 Swiss Francs, depending on the performance. The Ethical Committee of the University of Geneva approved the experimental protocol.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and the general experimental conditions were the same as in Experiment 3. A graphic software (Authorware) controlled the generation of the stimuli and the recording of the responses. There were three stimuli. The first two were a solid square (side: 8.87 deg) and a solid circle (radius: 4.96 deg) with the same surface. These stimuli, defined only by their colour (green or red), were made isoluminant with the help of a DPT92 Monitor Calibrator (X-Rite Inc., Grandville, MI, US). Their CIE X , Y , Z coordinates were respectively (X ¼ 9:86, Y ¼ 18:94, Z ¼ 4:32) and (X ¼ 32:69, Y ¼ 18:17, Z ¼ 3:09). Stimuli were presented against a grey background (X ¼ 28:15, Y ¼ 30:33, Z ¼ 44:88). At the beginning of a trial, one of the two figures was displayed at the centre of the screen. The third stimulus, a solid black circle (CIE coordinates: X ¼ 2:00, Y ¼ 1:98, Z ¼ 3:19) was also presented in conjunction with the central geometrical figure (see later) . At the onset of a trial, the black circle moved with a straight trajectory from the upper left corner of the screen toward the geometrical figure with a constant velocity of 20 deg/s.
Experimental procedure and task. Only the Colour/ Movement (CM) condition was tested. Trials began with the display of a central fixation point (a solid black circle, 1 cm in diameter) lasting 1 s. The moving black circle stopped as soon as it touched the central stimulus (one of the two geometrical figures in one of the two colours, for example, Red Square). At the same time, one of the attribute (colour or movement) switched between its two possible values. Then, the second attribute (movement or colour) also switched with an asynchrony D (SOA) varying between 0 and 320 ms in steps of 40 ms. By convention, the sign of the asynchrony interval D was set as negative when colour changed after movement and positive in the opposite case. In all cases, the central stimulus started moving toward the upper right corner with the same constant velocity as the black circle (20 deg/s). The entire sequence lasted 3 s. Thereafter, the screen was filled with the background, and remained so until the participant initiated a new trial by entering the response. As in Michotte's displays, the scene elicited the very vivid perceptual illusion of a mechanical interaction between two real objects. The task was to indicate (forced-choice) which attribute changed first by using two keys in the upper row of the keyboard (F5 for answer C and F12 for answer M).
There were 4 [transitions] · 17 [SOA] ¼ 72 different sequences (Table 7) . Each sequence was presented 10 times for a total of 720 trials (sequences with D ¼ 0 were presented twice). Thus, as in Experiment 3, the sample size for computing individual response frequencies was 40 for D 6 ¼ 0 and 80 for D ¼ 0. Sessions lasted approximately 30 min and were preceded by a period of adaptation to the dim ambient light, a verbal description of the task, and a familiarisation phase of 10 practice trials.
Results
The results are presented in Fig. 8 with the same format of Fig. 6 . As in Experiment 3, the probability of answering ''Colour'' increased monotonously when the SOA varied from )320 to +320 ms (lower panel). The z-transform of the raw (un-smoothed) response frequencies show that the psychometric function deviated significantly from a cumulative normal distribution (bottom panel). More importantly, the psychometric function was clearly asymmetric with respect to D ¼ 0 ðP D¼0 ¼ 0:75Þ, indicating that colour changes are processed faster than movement onset. The model introduced in Experiment 3 was fitted to the data points (continuous line) yielding an estimated asynchrony between the two processes of about 45 ms (upper panel in Fig. 8 ). The results demonstrate that, in this condition, movement onset is perceived with a delay with respect to colour change, as it was the case in Experiments 1 and 2. The asynchrony was smaller than that observed before, but was quite similar to the one estimated in Viviani and Aymoz (2001) .
The comparison between the two experimental conditions was carried out also at the individual level by considering the three parameters of the psychometric function defined above, namely the response frequency at D ¼ 0 ðP D¼0 Þ, the SOA for which responses are at chance level ðD p¼0:50 Þ, and the Just-Noticeable-Difference JND ¼ ðD p¼0:75 À D p¼0:25 Þ=2. Table 6 reports for comparison the values of these parameters for the individuals who participated in both Experiment 3 and 4. In all cases there was a significant difference between the corresponding parameters in the two conditions (ttest for paired samples; P D¼0 : t ¼ À3:750, p ¼ 0:005; 320, 280, 240, 200, 160, 120, 80, 40, 0 (ms) 
General discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed an earlier suggestion that changes in the colour, form and movement attributes of a visual configuration are processed at different rates. As in previous experiments, the movement channel was found to be slower than both the colour and form channel, the delay being of about 160 ms and 190 ms, respectively. Moreover, form processing outpaced colour processing by about 28 ms. The only difference between Experiment 1 and 2 was the velocity of the moving stimuli. The fact that the results in both conditions were well interpolated by the model, with essentially the same parameters, demonstrated that velocity is not a critical factor for determining the relative asynchronies. However, movement delays were considerably longer than those reported recently both by ourselves (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001) , and others (Arnold et al., 2001; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997a , 1997b . A likely explanation for the increased difference is that, unlike previous experiments, participants had to process almost simultaneously an acoustic and a visual stimulus. Thus, the click sound that provided the reference for judging the relative timing of the attribute changes may well have interfered with the processing of the visual information.
As regards the Form/Colour contrast, the estimated delay is close to the minimum threshold for temporal discrimination (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961; Steinb€ uchel von, Wittmann, & P€ oppel, 1996) . However, there is a clear disagreement between our finding that form changes reach consciousness before colour changes, and the results of Moutoussis and Zeki (1997b) indicating an opposite delay of 63 ms in favour of colour. A direct comparison between the two studies may not be entirely warranted because we tested actual shape changes, whereas Moutoussis and Zeki only tested changes in edge orientation. A full geometrical shape turning into another shape generates a richer array of changes than just an edge switching from one orientation to another. This, in turn, might result into a faster access to consciousness, either because individual changes reinforce mutually, or because some changes are processed faster than others, and the perception of just one of them is sufficient to signal the switching between forms. Note that, although the Form-Colour delay measured in our previous experiment (10 ms) was too small to reach statistical significance, it was in the same direction of the one measured here. More importantly, a greater saliency of form over colour changes emerged clearly, quite independently of the specific model we used to estimate the mean processing time. In fact, when the sound occurred at the same time of the colour and form changes ðD ¼ 0Þ, the probability of indicating the latter as being closest to the sound was significantly higher than 0.5 (Table 2) . Note also that the results obtained with our new technique are consistent with impulse-response (Burr & Morrone, 1993) , simultaneity judgments (Bowen, 1981) , and evoked potential (Fiorentini, Burr, & Morrone, 1991) results indicating that the channel involved in detecting luminance transients has a larger bandwidth than the channel involved in chromatic transients.
Both Moutoussis and Zeki (1997a) and Nishida and Johnston (2002) used as stimuli sequences of alternations between colour and movement direction, varying the phase between alternations until one has the impression that both attributes change simultaneously. Phase differences may be interpreted as processing delays, and this is indeed what Moutoussis and Zeki (1997a) did. However, a different account of the same data is also available (Johnston & Nishida, 2001 ). The neural processing of the attribute changes takes a finite amount of time. Moreover, the transition from one colour to another is a first-order temporal change, whereas the transition between opposite movement directions (turning points) is a second-order temporal change. Thus, accurate estimates of subjective simultaneity would require pairing events of different type. It could be, however, that observers erroneously link colour changes with transition in the motion sequence, i.e. with events of the same type. In this case, the phase difference that nulls the subjective delay would simply reflect this erroneous marker correspondence, rather than a true neural delay. Thus, results obtained with sequences of transitions are bound to be ambiguous. Such an ambiguity could not have arisen in Experiments 1 and 2 where--as in our previous study (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001 )--trials involved single transitions between the two attributes of the stimuli, not sequences of transitions. This seems to bar the possibility of explaining the observed asynchronies as the result of an erroneous pairing of markers. Indeed, Nishida and Johnston (2002) designed their Experiment 2 precisely for the purpose of demonstrating that no delay is present in the single transition condition, and, therefore, that phase differences measured with alternating stimuli should not be interpreted as processing delays. The question remains of why their results for the Colour/ Movement contrast (Nishida & Johnston, 2002; Fig. 2B) , are at variance with ours, and with similar results obtained by Arnold with the after-effect technique (Arnold et al., 2001 ). The crucial difference might be that both in our Experiments 1 and 2, and in our previous study (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001) there were no turning points in the movement, just a sudden transition from a steady position into uniform motion. Actually, the movement delay seems to depend on the angular difference between directions at the turning point (Arnold & Clifford, 2002) . Be as it may, in the absence of turning points, our observers could not have made the ''biased cross-attribute linkage of time markers of the same temporal type'' that, according to Nishida and Johnston (2002, p. 360) , has been mistakenly interpreted as a processing delay.
Taken together, the results of the three contrasts tested in Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that, when the stimuli are abstract geometrical forms, and the motion has no obvious cause, the outcome of the colour, form and movement channels reach consciousness at different times. This conclusion provides further support to the modular doctrine of vision. By contrast, the very presence of asynchronies in the perception of different attributes of the image is clearly inconsistent with the alternative view advocated recently by Lennie (1998) that most single neurons in the visual brain represent a value on a multidimensional vector that describes simultaneously all aspects of the image locally.
Experiment 3 demonstrated that the large asynchrony between colour and movement disappears when the stimulus is part of a naturalistic scene, and the motion is the consequence of a human gesture. A direct comparison is possible with the results of the Colour/Movement contrast in Viviani and Aymoz (2001) because the task was the same. The velocity of the moving stimuli was not the same as in our previous study. However, comparing Experiment 1 and 2 showed that this experimental parameter does not have a significant influence on the asynchronies. Thus, the only major difference between the two studies was the intervention of a human hand performing the lifting action.
One may attempt to explain why the moving hand suppresses perceptual asynchrony by invoking visual factors only. Whereas the display provides no clue about the colour switching time, the moment when the ball is going to move is anticipated by watching the hand during the approach phase. Thus, expectation of the impending movement may replace the actual stimulus in generating the corresponding time marker. If so, the absence of subjective asynchrony would imply that expectation sets the movement time marker about 60 ms earlier than the end of the duty cycle of the movement channel that processes the true onset of the movement (recall that in our previous experiment colour outpaced movement by the 60 ms). Alternatively, expectation may have a priming affect, by enhancing the dynamics of the movement channel. The control Experiment 4 in which the hand was replaced by an artificial agent dispelled both hypotheses. Indeed, all sources of purely visual information that might have affected the asynchrony in Experiment 3 were present also in Experiment 4. Yet, virtually the same asynchrony reported previously reappeared when the motion was not generated by a biological agent.
A different explanation of the role of the moving hand calls into play the interaction between visual and motor factors. As noted before, neurons in the monkey ventral premotor cortex are activated both when it performs a hand gesture, and when it watches the same action being performed by someone else. It has been proposed (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 2002) that these neurons are part of a network, which includes also area 7b of the inferior parietal lobule, matching action observation and execution. A number of studies (Gr ezes, Costes, & Decety, 1998; Hari et al., 1998) strongly suggest that such a ''mirror matching system'' exists also in humans, where its primary function would be to allow us to understand the behaviour of others. It can then be supposed that hand gestures perceived visually are interpreted by activating covertly the same motor structures involved in their actual execution.
We argued (Viviani, 2002 ) that such a recognition-byresonance mechanism, which is reminiscent of the one invoked in Liberman's theory of speech perception (Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967) , is implicated in the motor-perceptual interactions that occur when watching natural gestures. In particular, it has been shown that the kinematics of these gestures is perceived (Viviani & Stucchi, 1992) , reproduced (Viviani, Baud-Bovy, & Redolfi, 1997; Viviani, Campadelli, & Mounoud, 1987) , and anticipated (Kandel, Orliaguet, & Viviani, 2002; Orliaguet, Kandel, & B€ oe, 1997) better than that of non-biological motions. The naturalistic scene displayed in Experiment 3--unlike the artificial stimuli used both in our previous experiment (Viviani & Aymoz, 2001) , and in Experiment 4 might have activated the mirror matching system. If so, one can speculate that the suppression of the movement asynchrony is one by-product of this activation. To the extent that the mirror matching system is instrumental for generating a reliable representation of a human action, it may provide a binding mechanism whereby all attributes of the relevant events in the visual scene are set into strict time register before reaching consciousness. It should be stressed that we are not suggesting that such a temporal binding is vital for coherent perception. Many visual scenes that do not involve human gestures, and for which the mirror matching system is presumably inactive, are nevertheless perceived in what appears to be a unitary fashion. In such cases, differential delays of the order of tens of milliseconds among the various visual channels, which are detected experimentally, may well go unnoticed in everyday life. What we are suggesting, however, is that a synchronization of the various visual channels is an ingredient of the high perceptual tuning that we seem to have for human gestures.
Further research is needed to validate the hypothesis that motor factors are instrumental for suppressing the delay with which movement onset is perceived. However, the very fact that the asynchrony is present in some conditions (Experiments 1-3), and compensated in others (Experiment 4) indicates that, whatever the underlying process, binding is not a mandatory operation.
Perhaps, an adequate characterization of this process is provided by the notion of a flexible buffer receiving the output of specialized visual channels, and maintaining active the incoming information until the various pieces of information have coalesced. The degree of synchronization afforded by the buffer need not to be strict. It may actually be rather loose--of the order of a few tens of milliseconds--unless the stimuli have a peculiar salience, or the focussing of attention forces a stricter temporal alignment.
